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BETWEEN PRETEXT PLUS AND PRETEXT ONLY:
SHOULDERING THE EFFECTS OF PRETEXT ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AFTER ST. MARY'S




Sometimes a court's adherence to a particular doctrine subverts
the court's reasoning and undermines its conclusions. Courts that
take a strict position on an issue can miss important considerations
that do not adhere to the hard-line position. As a result, a court's
well-meaning intention to substantively conform its position to a
particular interpretation of the law can lead to misguided
decisionmaking.
One such issue that demonstrates the problems that arise when
courts take a hard-line position is the issue of pretext in employment
discrimination cases. A finding of pretext arises when a plaintiff
proves that an employer's given reason for dismissal or action taken is
actually false. The two major positions that a court can choose to
take are the "pretext plus" or the "pretext only" positions. The
pretext plus position is the view that the plaintiff must show pretext
plus proof of the employer's discriminatory animus to meet the
burden of proof for a finding of employment discrimination. The
pretext only position requires a finding of a prima facie case of
discrimination, plus a finding that the employer's proffered reasons
for dismissal are pretextual to satisfy a finding of employment
discrimination. The main difference between the two positions is that
the pretext plus position is a tougher standard for plaintiffs, requiring
proof of the employer's discriminatory intent, while the pretext only
position only requires proof of a pretext by the employer, not actual
discriminatory intent.
* J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1999; B.A., University of Michigan, 1994. The author
currently is an associate at Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman and Dicker, L.L.P. in New York,
practicing insurance defense and commercial litigation.
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One case addressing both the pretext plus and pretext only
positions, Fisher v. Vassar College, demonstrates the problems that
are inherent in advocating a strict interpretation of the law when a
case falls between the constraints of two positions.' In Fisher, the
Second Circuit addressed the issue of the meaning of a sustainable
finding of pretext in an employment discrimination case and
announced the standard to be applied to appellate review of district
court findings of employment discrimination.2 The particular issue
decided by the sharply divided en banc court was whether a finding of
discrimination based upon a prima facie case and a supportable
finding of pretext could be reversed on appeal as clearly erroneous.3
The majority held that a finding of pretext, together with a prima
facie case, still does not insulate a finding of discrimination from
appellate review. In contrast, the dissent suggested that a finding of
pretext almost always supports a finding that the employer's true
motivation was discriminatory. 4
This Note addresses problems with both the majority's and
dissent's views in Fisher regarding the correct standard for a finding
of pretext in employment discrimination cases. The Fisher en banc
majority advocated the pretext only standard, while the dissent
championed the pretext plus view. Both the majority and dissent
reflect the problems that are inherent when the court tries to adopt a
bright-line rule for the issue of pretext.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit must prove both
a prima facie case of discrimination, 5 and that the pretextual reason
offered by the employer is really a disguise for the employer's actual
discriminatory animus.6 However, it is unclear whether the Supreme
Court majority "intended to adopt the pretext plus position in its
starkest form: that pretext only is never sufficient to permit a finding
of discrimination, ' 7 or whether a finding of a prima facie case of
discrimination plus proof that the employer's proffered reason for the
dismissal is pretextual is sufficient to meet the burden of proof for a
1. 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).
Z Id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 1333, 1342-43.
5. 509 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1993).
6. Id.
7. Development in the Law-Employment Discrimination: Shifting Burdens of Proof in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1592 (1996) [hereinafter
Development].
[Vol. 75:153
BETWEEN PRETEXT PLUS AND PRETEXT ONLY
finding of employment discrimination.8
Part I explains the difference between the pretext plus and
pretext only positions. Part II of this Note sets out the factual and
procedural background to the issues raised in Fisher, and details the
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III examines
the Supreme Court's treatment of the burden of proof in employment
discrimination cases and explains the ambiguity surrounding the
pretext only versus pretext plus controversy. Part IV analyzes the
Fisher en banc majority's preference for a pretext plus burden of
proof and its conclusion that pretext only is not always sufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof for a finding of employment
discrimination. Part IV also analyzes the dissent's adoption of the
pretext only position that a finding of a prima facie case of
discrimination coupled with proof of the employer's pretextual
reasons for the plaintiff's dismissal usually satisfies the burden of
proof for a finding of employment discrimination. Part V looks at the
Hicks decision on pretext in employment discrimination cases, and
what interpretation of the law is correct. Part V applies the Supreme
Court's rationale in Hicks to Fisher and explores the lingering
negative consequences that result from strict adherence to either the
pretext plus or pretext only positions. This Note concludes that
neither the en banc majority's pretext plus preference nor the
dissent's pretext only position is completely satisfactory as a bright-
line rule for deciding the burden of proof in employment
discrimination cases.
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN PRETEXT ONLY AND PRETEXT PLUS
The difference between the pretext only and pretext plus
positions is significant. Until the Supreme Court's 1993 ruling in
Hicks, most lower courts took the pretext only view that a plaintiff
who presented facts creating a plausible inference of discrimination,
and who then went on to show that the employer's explanation for its
action was a pretext, was generally entitled to win the case.9 In the
Hicks case, however, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff not
only must undermine the credibility of the employer's explanation,
but also must actually prove intentional discrimination,1 a position
that has been called pretext plus. Despite the ruling, there has not
8. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
9. Id. at 502.
10. Id. at 502-03.
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been strict adherence to the Hicks position because the Supreme
Court did not explain precisely how plaintiffs can prove intentional
discrimination. As a result, lower courts have been divided on the
issue of pretext.
Before Hicks, a plaintiff in a pretext only circuit was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law if he could prove that the employer's
reason was not believable.11  After Hicks, in a pretext plus
jurisdiction, the plaintiff cannot prevail merely by disproving the
employer's reason. 12 Instead, the plaintiff must establish that the real
reason for the employer's action was discrimination. 13 According to
the pretext plus position, the plaintiff's proof of pretext does not
amount to proof of intentional discrimination. 14 All that is shown by
disproof of the employer's proffered reason is that the employer
misrepresented the true reasons for the action, not that the employer
violated Title VII."1 As a result of this higher standard of proof, a
plaintiff who would have received judgment as a matter of law by
proving that the employer's reasons for action were false in a pretext
only jurisdiction would lose for failing to meet his burden of proof in
a pretext plus jurisdiction.
II. FISHER V. VASSAR COLLEGE: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Dr. Fisher was a fifty-five-year-old, married woman when she
was denied tenure. 16  She held a Bachelor's degree from the
University of Wisconsin, and Master's and Ph.D. degrees in Zoology
from Rutgers University.7 Dr. Fisher engaged in post doctoral work
at Rutgers Medical School from 1963 to 1965.18 After she finished her
academic work in 1965, she returned home with her daughters.19 In
1974, she returned to teaching biology at Marist College.20 In 1977,
11. Id. at 526 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 502.
13. See id. at 511.
14. See Development, supra note 7, at 1591-92.
15. See id. at 1579.
16. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affid in part and




20. See id. at 1197.
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she began working at Vassar College as a Visiting Assistant Professor
in the Biology Department.2' She remained in the Biology
Department and was promoted to a tenure-track position in 1980.22
Her performance was reviewed in 1982, at which time she received a
contract extension and renewal for three years, which brought her up
for tenure review in 1985.23 She was denied tenure on March 29, 1985,
by a departmental panel that questioned her scholarly independence,
commitment to research and mastery of her field.
24
At the time of her tenure review, Dr. Fisher had seven peer-
reviewed publications and a completed manuscript, which was
subsequently published in a peer-reviewed journalm She had secured
three financial grants to support this work prior to accepting her
position with Vassar College. 26  While at Vassar, she secured five
grants from the National Science Foundation, as well as several
intramural grants. 27 Dr. Fisher also had consulships with the National
Science Foundation and the National Institutes for Health.28
B. District Court Decision
On June 14, 1993, Dr. Fisher, then a faculty member of Vassar
College, filed a suit against Vassar College in the Southern District of
New York alleging violations of Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), and the Equal Pay Act.2 9 After a
bench trial, the district court held that Fisher established that (1) she
was denied tenure in violation of Title VII, (2) she was denied tenure
in violation of the ADEA because of her age, and (3) she was denied
equal pay for equal work.30
The district court further held that, because of the Title VII
violations based on the finding of gender discrimination and
attorney's fees and costs, Fisher was entitled to recover back pay from
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1214.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1193, 1209.
25. See id. at 1198.
26. See id. at 1202.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1205.
29. See id. at 1193.
30. See id. at 1193-94. The court held that Vassar discriminated against Fisher based on a
"sex-plus" analysis because of her status as a married woman. A "sex plus" analysis means that
the discrimination was not only motivated by Fisher's gender, but also because she was married.
See id. at 1225.
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the time she was discharged in 1986 until the present. 31 She was also
entitled to recover double damages under the Equal Pay Act and
ADEA.32 Furthermore, the court ordered that Dr. Fisher was entitled
to reinstatement as an Associate Professor of Biology at Vassar, but
after two years, she would be subject to the college's evaluation
process.33
C. Appeal and Cross-Appeal
Both Fisher and Vassar College appealed the district court's
decision.34 Vassar argued that the district court committed reversible
error, and based its appeal on three grounds.35 First, Vassar argued
that Dr. Fisher had failed to sustain her burden of proving intentional
discrimination. 36 Second, the statistical proof relied on by the court
was fundamentally flawed and clearly erroneous.37 Third, the district
court's findings as to the age discrimination claim and the violation of
the Equal Pay Act, along with the resultant remedies imposed, all
constituted reversible error. 3
8
Dr. Fisher's cross-appeal was predicated on two grounds.39 First,
the district court erroneously failed to rule, based upon the facts
actually found by the court, that there was a prima facie case of
"simple" sex discrimination.40 Second, Fisher claimed that the court
erred in an attempt to make Dr. Fisher "whole" by granting relief in
the form of her reinstatement as an Associate Professor of Biology
with tenure for a period of two years, only thereafter to subject her to
an evaluation process similar to the one that initially led to the
lawsuit.
41
D. Second Circuit Decision
On September 7, 1995, the Second Circuit dismissed Fisher's
31. See id. at 1234.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 1235.
34. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), rev'd en banc, 114 F.3d 1332
(2d Cir. 1997).
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lawsuit.4 The court vacated the judgments of the district court, and
held that the district court's conclusions of liability on the sex
discrimination claim, the age discrimination claim, and the Equal Pay
Act claim were clearly erroneous.43 The court concluded that Dr.
Fisher was not entitled to attorney's fees since none of the claims
were successful. 44 Furthermore, the court affirmed the district court's
rejection of Fisher's "simple" sex discrimination claim, and therefore
held that it was not necessary to address Fisher's cross-appeal
regarding the terms of her reinstatement.
45
E. The Second Circuit En Banc Decision
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, sustained the district court's
findings that Fisher had established a prima facie case of sex-plus
discrimination and age discrimination. 46 However, the panel found
the evidence insufficient to support a finding that Vassar actually had
discriminated against her based on these claims, and reversed the
district court's decision.
47
The en banc majority explained that in the area of employment
discrimination, a finding of pretext against the employer, together
with a prima facie case, still does not insulate a finding of
discrimination: "We may reverse a district court's finding of
discrimination-even if accompanied by a supportable finding of
pretext-if we are firmly convinced, as the panel was here, that a
mistake has been made and that the plaintiff has failed to establish
intentional discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."" In
so holding, the en banc majority disagreed with the dissent's
suggestion that a finding of pretext almost always supports a finding
that the employer's true motivation was discriminatory.
49
F. Appeal to Supreme Court
The Supreme Court denied Fisher's appeal.5 0 As a result of the
42. See id. at 1420, 1454.
43. See id. at 1454.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1345.
47. See id. at 1345, 1347.
48. Id. at 1340.
49. See id. at 1331.
50. Fisher v. Vassar College, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998).
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order, Dr. Fisher will be out of her teaching position at Vassar
College permanently.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. The Evolution of the Supreme Court's Pretext Discussion
Dr. Fisher's case presents a legal issue that has troubled the
Supreme Court since Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which allows actions to be brought for employment
discrimination. The Court first laid the foundation for the elements
required to bring a prima facie employment discrimination case based
on circumstantial evidence in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.5
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court first
addressed the issue of pretext. The Court advocated the pretext only
position that a finding of pretext was sufficient, and that the plaintiff
had no burden to prove intentional discrimination by the employer.52
The issue of pretext was complicated in 1993 in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks when the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must
not only prove pretext by the employer, but also must actually prove
intentional discrimination by the employer.53 How the plaintiff is to
prove intentional discrimination in the absence of direct evidence
remains to be clarified by the Supreme Court.
B. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: The Prima Facie Standard
for Employment Discrimination Cases
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, a black civil rights activist,
engaged in disruptive and illegal activity against his employer,
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and was subsequently discharged.5 4
When McDonnell Douglas advertised for qualified personnel and
rejected the plaintiff's reemployment application on the ground of
illegal conduct, the plaintiff sued claiming violation of provisions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 The Supreme Court held that,
although the plaintiff proved a prima facie case under Title VII,
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
53. 509 U.S. at 502, 519-20.
54. 411 U.S. at 792.
55. See id.
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McDonnell Douglas provided a rebuttable presumption by stating
that it rejected the plaintiff because of his unlawful conduct.16 The
Court concluded that McDonnell Douglas' reason met its burden to
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination.5
7
The Supreme Court first described the elements a plaintiff must
prove to establish a prima facie discrimination case under Title VII in
McDonnell Douglas.8 The prima facie route is designed for plaintiffs
who do not have direct evidence of discrimination, and consists of a
burden-shifting framework.5 9 In the first stage, the plaintiff has the
burden of showing a prima facie case to create a presumption of
discrimination.6° Once shown, the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, business-related reason for the difference in
treatment,61 a burden that the Supreme Court has characterized as
easy to meet.6 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff for the
third stage, sometimes called the pretext stage, when the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy of
credence, for example, mere pretexts for an underlying discriminatory
motive.6
3
Rather than a mere procedural threshold, the prima facie case
now serves as a rough introduction to the merits of the action. The
prima facie case emerged from McDonnell Douglas as a four-pronged
test: an aggrieved plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position for which he was
not hired, retained, or offered promotion; (3) despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and, (4) after he was denied the
position, the post either remained open or was filled by someone not
a member of the protected class.64 Because the purpose of the prima
facie case is to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination, the
requirements described above are supposed to be de minimis. 6s
56. See id.
57. See id. at 803.
58. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801; (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2003-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1996) [hereinafter Title VII].)
59. The "direct evidence" case, drawn from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989), occurs when a plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination and shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that she suffered disparate treatment.
60. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
61. See id. at 802.
62. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56.
63. See Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511-12. To prove pretext, a plaintiff may rely on indirect
evidence such as disparaging comments and other circumstantial pieces of information.
64. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
65. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-12.
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Additionally, the elements of the prima facie case are flexible,
although its purpose remains constant in employment discrimination
cases. "While its elements will vary depending on the circumstances
of the case, the fundamental purpose of the prima facie case is to
require the plaintiff to show (1) that an adverse employment action
occurred, and (2) that the most common explanations for an adverse
employment action, such as incompetence, are not applicable. ''6
6
C. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine: The
Development of the Defendant's Burden of Proof for Pretext
In Burdine, the plaintiff, a female accounting clerk, sued the
Texas Department of Community Affairs alleging that she was
denied a promotion and was terminated because of her sex. 67 The
Supreme Court held that, "when the employee had proved a prima
facie case of employment discrimination, the employer bore only the
burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its
actions and bore no burden of persuading the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the challenged employment existed." 68 The court also
held that "there was no requirement that the employer hire a
minority or female applicant whenever that person's objective
qualification was [sic] equal to those of a white male applicant." 69
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant after the plaintiff established a prima facie case.70 In
Burdine, the court clarified the standard for the burden of proof for
the defendant employer when the unanimous Court, speaking
through Justice Powell, said that the ultimate burden of persuasion
remained with the plaintiff.7' Under Burdine, satisfaction of the
defendant's burden serves two functions: it deflates the evidentiary
presumption of the prima facie case and sharpens the issues for
litigation by calling forth all the defendant's arguments for the
plaintiff to challenge.7 2 As a result, the defendant's burden is light
66. Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Krinik v.
County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995)).
67. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
71. Id. at 254-56.
72. Id. at 255-56. The Court noted that the defendant's evidence must be clearly
articulated and admissible as evidence at trial; indeed, if left unaddressed, this should be "legally
sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant." Id. at 255.
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and requires only an explanation of the nondiscriminatory reasons for
his actions. The defendant does not have to provide evidence of any
other reasons for his actions.
D. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Permissive Passage of
Hicks and the Pretext Only Versus Pretext Plus Debate
As the Court made clear in Hicks, the defendant's burden of
proof is light.73 Indeed, the defendant's burden of proof is little more
than a mechanical formality; a defendant, unless silent, will almost
always prevail.74 The Supreme Court also determined that credibility
assessments for the employer will be evaluated when the plaintiff
rebuts the employer's proffered reasons for its action, and not when
the defendant rebuts any legal presumption of intentional
discrimination.75  An absurd justification for firing a worker, for
example, will not fail at the second, but rather at the third stage of the
pretext framework.
In Hicks, the petitioner, a black man, worked as a correctional
officer at St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by the
Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources.76 The
plaintiff brought a Title VII action, alleging that the defendant
demoted and discharged him because of his race.77 The Supreme
Court held that the court of appeals' rejection of St. Mary's asserted
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its challenged actions did
not entitle the plaintiff to a judgment as a matter of law under the
McDonnell Douglas framework since the plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion of a violation of Title VII.
7s
The greatest development and controversy for the Supreme
Court involves the pretext stage: whether the plaintiff's exposure of
the defendant's explanations as pretextual constitutes a finding of
discrimination, or whether the plaintiff must show pretext "plus"
affirmative indicia of discriminatory animus. 9 The Court's purported
73. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510.
74. If the defendant cannot produce a legitimate business reason for an adverse decision,
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. at 509.
75. "In the nature of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of
production (and has thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination) can
involve no credibility assessment." Id. at 509.
76. Id. at 502-504.
77. See id. at 502.
78. See id. at 511.
79. See id. at 502.
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resolution of the issue in Hicks favored pretext plus (i.e., pretext plus
proof of the employer's discriminatory animus).8° However, the 5-4
decision in Hicks demonstrated the complexity of the pretext issue
because the justices disagreed on the quantum of evidence needed to
satisfy the additional requirement of discriminatory intent.81
This pretext plus versus pretext only debate stemmed from
Justice Scalia's "permissive passage" for the majority about evidence
required to prove discriminatory animus:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer
the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination .... 82
This "permissive passage" casts considerable doubt on whether the
Hicks majority intended to adopt the pretext plus position in its
strictest form:83 pretext only is never sufficient to permit a finding of
discrimination. 84 If anything, the ruling seems to reject a finding of
mechanical pretext only because the Supreme Court said that "the
factfinder's belief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination." This statement seems to
reject the pretext only position that a finding of pretext by the
defendant is sufficient to make a finding of discrimination without
requiring the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent by the employer
(the "plus" in pretext plus). Instead, the statement is ambiguous and
implies that sometimes the factfinder's disbelief of the defendant's
reasons (i.e., that there is a pretext) can result in a finding of
discrimination, but the statement does not mandate a finding of
discrimination, as the pretext only position would require. Therefore,
Hicks does not preclude pretext plus courts from retaining their
additional burdens in cases where the plaintiff must prove pretext
plus intentional discrimination.
The Hicks dissent, written by Justice Souter, strongly disagreed
80. Id.
81. Id. at 511.
82. Id. (emphasis added to "may" and "suffice") (emphasis to "permit" in original). This
"permissive" passage has been quoted by almost every circuit court that has interpreted Hicks
scope. See Jody H. Odell, Comment, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: Understanding St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and Its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
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with Justice Scalia's opinion, accusing the majority of ignoring
language in both McDonnell Douglas and Burdine.85  The dissent's
main concern with the majority's ruling was that the plaintiff was
stripped of the use of circumstantial evidence to prove evidence of
intentional discrimination.8 6  Justice Souter severely criticized the
majority for requiring that the plaintiff in a Title VII case disprove
"all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find
lurking in the record."87
The dissent further criticized the majority's position because "its
scheme places an employer who lies in a better position than an
employer who says nothing." 88 The dissent reasoned that "[u]nder the
majority's scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie, but succeeds
in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its actions, will
win its case and walk away rewarded for its falsehoods."89 The dissent
did not think that Title VII should be driven by concern for
employers who are dishonest in court "at the expense of victims of
discrimination who do not happen to have direct evidence of
discriminatory intent." 90
New questions have arisen from the reading of Hicks based on
Justice Scalia's permissive passage that could be interpreted as saying
that a showing of pretext "may always" permit a judgment for the
plaintiff-the pretext only position.91 Just-as the Hicks majority
construed "pretext" as shorthand for "pretext for discrimination,"
another court could infer from "may always" the position that a
showing of pretext "may always" permit a judgment for the plaintiff.92
Lower courts have wrestled with the Court's language in the
permissive passage -that the factfinder "may" infer discrimination on
a showing of pretext only-leading to several possibilities for
85. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 526, 533 (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. "[T]he majority's scheme greatly disfavors Title VII plaintiffs without the good luck to
have direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Id. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 534-535 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 540 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 511.
92 Id. "The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly
if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the
prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination." Id. (emphasis added to "may" and
"suffice") (emphasis to "permit" in original). This statement in the "permissive passage" could
be interpreted as saying that a showing of pretext may always permit a judgment for the
plaintiff.
1999]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
interpreting the passage. 93 For example, the factfinder could decide
to infer discrimination on the prima facie case and pretext only.94 The
factfinder could also interpret the permissive language in the passage
as establishing a legal standard from which courts are free to depart.
95
Either interpretation is possible since both seem plausible; the issue is
somewhat confusing and has led to sharp disagreements between
judges as evidenced by the disagreement between the majority and
dissenting justices in Fisher.
96
IV. NEITHER THE PRETEXT ONLY NOR PRETEXT PLUS POSITIONS IN
FISHER SHOULD BE STRICTLY ADOPTED SINCE BOTH POSITIONS
CONSTRAIN THE COURT'S REASONING AND LIMIT THE COURT'S
DECISION
The key disagreement between the en banc majority and the
dissenting justices in Fisher lies in the realm of the pretext plus and
pretext only positions.97 Although the conflict seems minimal when
applied to cases where there is overt evidence of discriminatory
animus, the circumstances in Fisher heighten the conflicts inherent
within both positions. In Fisher, one could argue that discrimination
or the faculty's dislike for Dr. Fisher resulted in Dr. Fisher's denial of
tenure. 98 Consequently, the rigidity of both the Fisher en banc
majority and the dissenting opinions in adhering to the pretext only
and pretext plus ideologies constrain the justices' reasoning.99 This
rigidity also creates confusion for district courts when determining
how to apply a sustainable finding of pretext to employment
discrimination cases because of the debate. 1°°
The Fisher en banc majority was too quick to conclude that a
finding of a prima facie case of discrimination and a sustainable
finding of pretext by the employer is not sufficient to constitute a
finding of employment discrimination.lO1 The majority stated that it
was limiting its en banc consideration to the issue of "whether a
finding of discrimination that is based on a prima facie case and a
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supportable finding of pretext may be reversed on appeal as clearly
erroneous, or whether such a finding must be upheld absent
some... evidence that the employer took the adverse action for some
other non-discriminatory reason.' 10 2 This issue was not in question,
however, since the Supreme Court held findings of discrimination are
subject to such review.103
Instead, the key issue in Fisher, as identified by Chief Justice
Newman in his dissent, is the significance a court should give to a
sustainable finding of pretext.10 Chief Justice Newman describes
several possible ways the court can interpret a sustainable finding of
pretext, focusing on the weight that it should have as evidence of
discrimination: "Does [a sustainable finding of pretext] point toward
discrimination, but with only minimal probative force, as perhaps
some believe? Or does it point toward discrimination with strong
probative force, at least in the absence of evidence that blunts such
probative force?" 105  As Chief Justice Newman points out, the
majority's ambiguity about the weight a sustainable finding of pretext
plays in a finding of discrimination provides no guidance for lower
courts about how much probative value the court should give to a
finding of pretext.1°6 As a result, the majority's reasoning is confusing
and provides unclear guidelines about the role a sustainable finding of
pretext should play in employment discrimination cases in the Second
Circuit.
The dissenting opinions in Fisher are somewhat unclear on the
issue of what role a finding of pretext should play in determining
whether Vassar College was guilty of discrimination. In contrast to
the majority, the dissent advocates a pretext only position, which
would find that a sustainable finding of pretext and a prima facie case
are enough to uphold a finding of discrimination even when a
possible third explanation for the employer's behavior could prove
the employer's true motive was not discriminatory. 0 7 The problem
with the dissent's strict reading of a pretext only position is that cases
exist where an employer can have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for dismissing an employee that is different from the
102. Id. at 1334.
103. See id. at 1362.
104. Id. at 1379 (Newman, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
106. See id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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pretextual reason being offered. 108 For example, in Hicks, St. Mary's
stated that they fired the plaintiff because of his severe accumulation
of rule infractions.1°9 However, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to determine if the true reason for Hicks' dismissal was personal
animosity between him and his boss- a third viable
nondiscriminatory reason for the defendant's action, but different
from the explanation the defendant originally offered."0 As a result,
a viable reason existed for St. Mary's dismissal of the plaintiff other
than discrimination and the pretextual reason offered by St. Mary's.
Just as reasons other than discrimination existed for the dismissal
of the plaintiff in Hicks, three possible reasons existed for the
plaintiff's tenure denial in Fisher: illegal discrimination, which Dr.
Fisher alleged; universal dislike of Dr. Fisher by the faculty; and the
pretextual reason, insufficient academic publication, which the
defendant offered to satisfy its burden of production."' Had Dr.
Fisher successfully shown that the publication excuse was pretextual,
she could not have prevailed under the Hicks majority's pretext plus
view without a showing that it was also a pretext for discrimination. 1 2
However, under the Hicks dissent's strict pretext only position, Fisher
would have won automatically because the court would infer a finding
of discrimination since the publication reason was a pretext." 3 Yet, if
the real reason Fisher was not granted tenure was not discriminatory,
but because the faculty did not like her, the pretext only strict
interpretation of the evidence would be incorrect because she would
not have received tenure based on a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason.114  Again, the problem is highlighted by the dissent's
adherence to the strict pretext only position that a sustainable finding
of pretext and the prima facie case are enough to infer a finding of
discrimination even when another plausible explanation is available
to explain St. Mary's actions. Specifically, the fact that the faculty did
not like Dr. Fisher.
108. For example, Vassar said that Dr. Fisher was not well-liked by the faculty, which is a
legitimate reason for denying tenure and is nondiscriminatory.
109. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 529.
110. See id. at 524.





BETWEEN PRETEXT PLUS AND PRETEXT ONLY
V. BECAUSE THE HICKS DECISION IS OPEN TO TWO DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS, THE PRETEXT DEBATE HAS NOT BEEN
RESOLVED AND BOTH THE PRETEXT PLUS AND PRETEXT ONLY
POSITIONS CAN BE JUSTIFIED BASED ON How THE LOWER COURTS
INTERPRET HICKS' PERMISSIVE PASSAGE
The majority in Fisher relied on the Hicks decision to justify its
position that Fisher failed to prove that Vassar's true reason for
denying her tenure was because of discriminatory animus."n The
majority adopted the pretext plus view that Fisher needed to prove
not only that Vassar's proffered reason was pretextual, but also that
its true reason for its action was discriminatory." 6 What is not clear
from Fisher, however, is which interpretation of Hicks the Fisher
majority adopted. Lower courts applied Hicks in two key
interpretations, a broad interpretation of the pretext plus view, and a
narrower interpretation. Both interpretations are helpful in
understanding the rationale underlying the Fisher court's reasoning,
and both interpretations have implications for the Fisher decision.
One possible broad interpretation of Hicks is that it is an
affirmation of the pretext plus position, namely that a showing of
pretext is never sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof
unless combined with additional evidence of discriminatory intent.
11 7
Textual support for this reading is found in the language of Hicks that
appears to require a dual evidentiary showing from the plaintiff. For
example, Justice Scalia wrote that a "reason cannot be proved to be 'a
pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason.11 8 He also said
that "nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful
discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the
employer's explanation of its action was not believable."11 9 Clearly,
Justice Scalia and the Hicks majority believe that a finding that the
employer lied about its reasons for its action is not the equivalent of a
finding of unlawful discrimination by the employer.
This broad interpretation also finds support in portions of the
opinion that denigrate the probative value of the prima facie case,
115. Id. at 1332.
116. See id. at 1339.
117. See Development, supra note 7, at 1580.
118. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
119. Id. at 514-515.
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suggesting that a prima facie showing is merely a procedural ordering
of the production of the evidence. For example, Justice Scalia wrote
that, once the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination,
"the McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and
burdens-is no longer relevant.' 1 20  Therefore, after the initial
proffering of evidence, the only remaining issue for the court is
whether the plaintiff proved discrimination by the employer. The
Hicks majority also stated that after the second stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the inquiry then moves from "the
few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific
proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation. ' ' 12  These
comments indicate that the prima facie case and proof of pretext do
not have much value in and of themselves, but only serve as
procedural steps along the way to establishing the ultimate issue of
discrimination.
An alternate interpretation of Hicks is that the holding of the
opinion is much narrower in scope. Rather than establishing an
additional burden of proof for the plaintiff, the opinion merely
reverses the Eight Circuit's holding in Hicks that a prima facie case
plus a showing of pretext compels a judgment for the plaintiff as a
matter of law.122  Under this narrower or permissive inference
interpretation, proof of the prima facie case and pretext permits the
factfinder to infer discrimination, although it does not mandate such a
judgment. 23 Courts that interpret the opinion in this way rely on the
permissive passage. 124 If this is the proper interpretation of Hicks,
then the Supreme Court adopted a position that falls between the
requirements of pretext only and pretext plus: although not entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law upon proof of a prima facie case and
pretext, a plaintiff may prevail without having to introduce additional
evidence of discrimination.
What the Hicks decision makes clear under both the broad
interpretation of the pretext plus view and the narrower
interpretation, is that, even if a court infers discrimination from the
plaintiff's prima facie case and pretext, it still must make a specific
finding of intentional discrimination in order for the plaintiff to carry
120. Id. at 510. "[T]he McDonnell Douglas presumption is a procedural device, designed
only to establish an order of proof and production." Id. at 521.
121. Id. at 516.
122. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992).
123. See Development, supra note 7, at 1581.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 82, 92.
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its ultimate burden.125 The requirement of a specific finding of
intentional discrimination reflects two conclusions developed in
Justice Scalia's opinion. First, such a finding is mandated because the
majority recognized a distinction between proof of pretext and proof
of intentional discrimination.126 Because the majority did not equate
"the required finding that the employer's action was the product of
unlawful discrimination" with the "much different (and much lesser)
finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable,"'127 the factfinder must specifically state that it draws from
the evidence of pretext an inference of discrimination. 128 Second, as
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 makes clear, the plaintiff at all times
retains the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination. 129
Requiring the district court to make the specific finding of intentional
discrimination avoids speculation as to whether or not the plaintiff
carried this burden.
The permissive inference or narrow reading of Hicks gained
favor as the correct interpretation in the Second Circuit.130  In
DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Schooll3l, the plaintiff, a teacher at a
Catholic school, claimed that he was dismissed because of his age. 32
Describing the issues presented under an age discrimination claim,
the Second Circuit interpreted the holding of Hicks to support a
permissive inference position:
[t]he Supreme Court recently held.., that the mere fact that a
defendant proffers a false reason for a challenged employment
action does not necessarily establish liability. Proof that the
employer has provided a false reason for its action permits the
finder of fact to determine that the defendant's actions were
motivated by an improper discriminatory intent, but does not
compel such a finding.133
125. Justice Scalia emphasized this requirement in his opinion stating that "[e]ven
though.., rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding of
discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 n.4.
126. See id. at 514-515.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. "[A] presumption.., does not shift.., the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast." FED. R. EVID. 301.
130. See Development, supra note 7, at 1579.
131. 4 F.3d 166,168 (2d Cir. 1993).
132. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim because consideration of the case
would result in excessive entanglement in religion. See id. at 169. The Second Circuit reversed
and concluded that the issues arising under an age discrimination claim do not give rise to First
Amendment claims. See id. at 166.
133. Id. at 170.
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The Second Circuit also articulated this interpretation of Hicks
in Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital.3 4 The Second Circuit
said, "[i]n some instances, as Justice Scalia notes, a plaintiff may meet
this ultimate burden of proof by combining her proof of the elements
constituting a prima facie case with evidence that defendant's
proffered reasons for its acts were false. ' 135 Both of these cases
demonstrate that the Second Circuit favors the permissive inference
approach, which falls between the pretext plus and pretext only
positions, by allowing a plaintiff to sometimes prove discrimination by
showing the defendant's proffered reasons to be false, without always
forcing the court to infer that the employer's reasons were
discriminatory.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S RATIONALE IN HICKS AND FISHER
A. The Fisher Majority and Dissent Misconstrue Hicks By Failing to
Acknowledge that More Than One Viable Interpretation of Hicks
Exists
Both the Fisher majority and dissenting opinions rely on Hicks.13 6
However, as discussed earlier, Hicks is open to two interpretations,
namely the permissive inference or narrow interpretation and the
pretext plus position, which are both persuasive. Because neither the
Fisher majority nor dissenting opinions acknowledge that more than
one viable interpretation of Fisher exists, both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Fisher can be criticized for not interpreting
Hicks more broadly. Both the Fisher majority and dissent also falter
for limiting their perspectives to the constraints of their own
positions, without at least discussing other possible interpretations of
Hicks.
The Fisher majority believed that the pretext only position
adopted by the dissent was wrong: "[w]e simply disagree with the
dissent's suggestion that a finding of pretext in all but a few specified
categories of cases reasonably supports a finding of discrimination, as
the true motivation."'37 The majority added that "[t]he main thrust of
the [Hicks] decision as [they] read it, is that once the minimal prima
134. 4 F.3d 134, 135 (2d Cir. 1993).
135. Id. at 142. Because the plaintiff had introduced substantial direct evidence of
retaliation, however, the decision did not rest upon the issue of pretext. See id. at 141-42.
136. Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1343.
137. Id. The majority went on to justify its pretext plus decision through reliance on Justice
Scalia's opinion in Hicks. See id.
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facie case has served its purpose of forcing the employer to proffer a
reason, all presumptions drop out and the case proceeds like any
other, i.e., with the burden on plaintiff to prove the case by evidence
of discrimination."138 In contrast, the dissent points to Justice Scalia's
opinion to justify its pretext only position: "Justice Scalia does not
doubt that a proffered explanation found by a factfinder not to be the
reason believed by the defendant, is a pretext, and (whether
perjurious or not) supports an inference, when coupled with the facts
of a prima facie case, that the true reason was discrimination." '139
If the Fisher majority and dissenting opinion acknowledged that
more than one possible interpretation for Hicks exists, then both
opinions would be more coherent and stronger. Instead, by refusing
to analyze the varying interpretations of Hicks, the Fisher majority
and dissent constrain their reasoning and reduce their decisions to
rhetoric. In addition, both the majority and dissenting opinions
simplify the pretext debate and limit it within the constructs of
positions that reflect the justices' own opinions about the role of
pretext, rather than reflecting upon the merits of Fisher's case. As a
result, both the majority and dissenting opinions demonstrate
problems that arise when adherence to a particular doctrine weakens
the justices' conclusions and undermines their positions.
B. The Consequences of Both Hicks and Fisher for Employment
Discrimination Cases
Hicks and Fisher will have important consequences for future
employment discrimination cases. Both decisions will impact whether
or not the courts adopt a pretext plus, or a pretext only position in
determining what effect a sustainable finding of pretext will have on a
determination of discrimination. Both decisions suggest that the
burden will be harder on plaintiffs. Further, as many legal
commentators have noted, the decisions will have future lingering
consequences such as failing to provide guidance to lower courts on
the proper role of pretext in employment discrimination cases,
chilling potential plaintiffs from bringing claims, and affecting
summary judgment decisions. Ultimately, the long-term
consequences of the Fisher and Hicks decisions illustrate the
problems that exist when the court adopts a narrow interpretation of
138. Id
139. Id. at 1372.
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the law based on a pretext plus or pretext only position.
One view espoused by supporters of the Hicks majority argues
that the pretext plus position will not preclude plaintiffs from being
successful in employment discrimination cases and will actually help
to clarify the process for successfully bringing a claim. 140 In St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks: The "Pretext Maybe" Approach, one
commentator suggests that Hicks is not an obstacle for plaintiffs:
"Hicks... is not a death knell for Title VII plaintiffs, but merely a
clarification of a framework which assists the plaintiff with an
inference of discrimination, while correctly insisting that the
plaintiff's ultimate burden is carried only by proving
discrimination. 141
Support of the Hicks majority's standard of the burden of proof
for plaintiffs is somewhat problematic for the Fisher majority since
the majority did not adequately provide a framework for determining
how lower courts should weigh a sustainable finding of pretext in the
Second Circuit. As identified by Chief Justice Newman in his dissent,
the majority fails to provide clear guidelines for lower courts about
what role a sustainable finding of pretext should play in a finding of
discrimination.142 Because the Fisher majority did not provide
guidance for lower courts about the proper role of pretext, lower
courts in the Second Circuit will continue to be confused and rely on
the pretext plus and pretext only positions to justify their decisions,
without fully explaining the rationale for their decisions. The lack of
direction from the Fisher majority will create a lingering negative
effect in that the lower courts will continue to adhere to hard-line
positions without proper justification or precedent, which will lead to
more overall confusion on the issue of pretext.
Critics of the Hicks majority have asserted that the decision
thwarts the intent of Title VII. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Has the Supreme Court Turned Its Back on Title VII by Rejecting
"Pretext Only?," another commentator argues that "[t]he holding in
Hicks gives the employer a distinct advantage by rejecting the
'pretext only' rationale and forcing the employee to go beyond the
proof of falsity of the defendant's proffered reasons.' ' 43  The
140. See, e.g., Michael J. Lambert, Comment, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks: The "Pretext
Maybe" Approach, 29 NEw ENG. L. REV. 163, 207 (1994).
141. Id.
142. See Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1379 (Newman, C.J. dissenting).
143. Louis M. Rappaport, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Has the Supreme Court
Turned Its Back on Title VII by Rejecting "Pretext Only?," 39 VILL. L. REV. 123, 159 (1994).
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commentator further argues that the pretext only position will have
long-term negative consequences for discrimination, particularly for
civil rights. 14
The concerns raised regarding the effect of pretext on civil rights,
and the burden of proof for employees, reflect serious consequences
that could result from Fisher and Hicks. While the Fisher majority
did not intend to prevent plaintiffs like Fisher from bringing
employment discrimination claims, the decision could chill zealous
advocacy on behalf of plaintiffs who have been discriminated against
in the workplace because of the majority's strict adherence to the
pretext plus position. As a result, if a potential plaintiff does not have
strong circumstantial or direct evidence that an employer's proffered
reason for its action is discriminatory, the plaintiff may decide not to
pursue a claim based on the Fisher majority's pretext plus position
and its tough burden for plaintiffs.
As legal commentators have also suggested, the purpose of Title
VII is to deter discriminatory behavior by employers, a purpose that
is complicated by Hicks.145 This criticism of Hicks is also applicable to
the Fisher majority because the majority's strict adherence to the
pretext plus doctrine runs counter to the purpose of both Title VII,
and of the general policy of eradicating discriminatory conduct in the
workplace. In addition, the reluctance of potential plaintiffs to file
suit for employment discrimination claims will run against the
purpose of Title VII, which is to provide a remedy to employees who
have been discriminated against. 146 All of the potentially negative
consequences stemming from Hicks and Fisher and the strict
adherence to the pretext plus position demonstrate the danger of
conforming to a narrow interpretation of discrimination.
Hicks and Fisher will also affect the decisions of summary
judgment motions. One advantage of the pretext only position
espoused by the Fisher dissent is that the employer will not prevail on
a motion for summary judgment. 147 Arguably, under a pretext plus
analysis, a defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted
in cases where the plaintiff has shown only that the defendant's
explanation conceals discriminatory animus. 148 Under a pretext only
analysis, summary judgment is not appropriate because a factual issue
144. See id. at 159.
145. See id. at 161.
146. See id. at 161.




has been raised-namely, whether the plaintiff's rebuttal proof
coupled with prima facie evidence demonstrates pretext for
discrimination. 49 Although plaintiffs may be able to withstand a
summary judgment motion by employers, as Fisher demonstrates, a
plaintiff will still have a tough time meeting the burden under the
pretext plus position, which could result in a judgment for the
employer.
The Hicks and Fisher majorities' adherence to the pretext plus
position will have negative consequences in several respects. The
lower courts will not have any clear guidelines about how to evaluate
a sustainable finding of pretext, which will lead to more confusing
decisions. Potential plaintiffs will be deterred from bringing claims
based on the higher burden of proof set forth by Hicks and Fisher,
and based on the fear that employers could take retributive action
against potential plaintiffs. In addition, both Hicks and Fisher will
chill litigation by plaintiffs and undermine the purpose of Title VII to
provide a remedy to people who are discriminated against in the
workplace. Also, the Hicks and Fisher majorities and dissents strict
positions demonstrate how rigid adherence to the pretext plus or
pretext only views can miss important considerations that do not
adhere to their hard-line positions. Instead, the Hicks and Fisher
courts fail to consider the consequences of their decisions, which can
affect future litigation by plaintiffs, summary judgment motions, and
future decisions by lower courts on the issue of pretext.
CONCLUSION
The majority and dissenting opinions in Fisher both advocate
strict interpretations of the pretext only and pretext plus positions for
deciding the validity of a finding of discrimination in employment
discrimination cases. Although the majority and dissent disagree on
the outcome of the case, their strict adherence to the dogma of each
respective position undermines the reasoning of their conclusions.
Ultimately, both the majority and the dissent in Fisher show the
advantage to applying a more flexible view of interpreting a
sustainable finding of pretext in an employment discrimination case
when more than one motive exists for the employer's actions.
In addition, the lingering negative consequences from the Hicks
and Fisher courts' adherence to the pretext plus and pretext only
149. See id.
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doctrines further illustrate the dangers that result from limiting a
decision to one position. Some of the important considerations the
Hicks and Fisher decisions failed to consider include: chilling
potential claims by plaintiffs, negatively affecting summary judgment
motions, providing little guidance to lower courts about the proper
role of a sustainable finding of pretext, and undermining the purpose
of Title VII. Ultimately, both Hicks and Fisher provide examples of
courts that would rather adhere to a strict position on the issue of
pretext, instead of providing new solutions to the rigid views that
created the problems in the first place. What both Fisher and Hicks
do show is that neither the pretext only nor the pretext plus view is
completely satisfactory as a bright-line rule for deciding how to
evaluate pretext in employment discrimination cases. Thus, the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit should strive to provide some
guidance to clarify the pretext debate in future employment
discrimination cases.

